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"IS NOTHING SACRED?": FLAG
DESECRATION, THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
RELIGION
JAMES MCBRIDE*

"Patriotism is in political life what faith is in religion."

-Lord Acton
I.

INTRODUCTION

Lord Acton's aphorism succinctly captures the sentiments expressed by political figures and the public alike in the present constitutional controversy over flag desecration. Reverence for the nation's standard is expressed in hallowed tones; however, it is
generally assumed that this relationship remains a metaphor and
no more. The metaphoric distance between religion and politics
embodies the separation of church and state, and legal discourse
prevents its collapse into an established civil religious order. Yet,
from the standpoint of a "hermeneutics of suspicion," Lord Acton's aphorism belies an intimate relationship between flag and
faith that transcends mere analogy.
This kinship, which threatens to rise to consciousness in the
political response to flag-burning, is camouflaged by a legal discourse which treats the issue as if it were a matter of free speech.
Hence, the Supreme Court opinions in Texas v. Johnson1 and
United States v. Eichman2 serve as an alibi for the religio-political
character of the controversy. However, neither Johnson nor Eich* Assistant Professor of Religion and Social Ethics, Fordham University at Lincoln
Center; B.A. 1972, Johns Hopkins University; M.A. 1974, University of Chicago; Ph.D. 1985,
Graduate Theological Union - University of California at Berkeley.
1 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court held that a
conviction for burning an American flag in political protest violated the first amendment
right of free speech. Id. at 2538-48.
2 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990). In Eichman, the defendants were charged with violating the
Flag Protection Act of 1989 by knowingly setting fire to several "United States flags while
protesting the Act's passage. Id. at 2406-09. However, the Court held that the Act suppressed expressive conduct and was therefore an infringement on first amendment rights.
Id. at 2408-09.
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man satisfied those who called for special protection of the nation's
standard by means of the Flag Protection Act of 19893 (the "Act")
or a proposed constitutional amendment.4
In this respect, legal and political discourse are at odds. Legal
discourse strains to repress the popular outcry whose inarticulate
and at times incoherent expression, even by the highest elected officials, testifies to the totemic status of the flag. Despite the attempts of courts and legal scholars to construct the controversy
along free speech lines,5 flag desecration remains for actors and
spectators alike an essentially homeopathic and contagious magical
act that defiles the sacredness of the body politic. The metaphoric
distance between flag and faith collapses in the act of flag-burning.
It is not surprising that many outraged citizens call for the institutionalization of what sociologists have dubbed "religious interdiction"-codified behavior against desecration of sacred objects. Of
Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988)). Following the Johnson decision, Congress passed the Act to replace the then existing federal flag
burning statute. See Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2407 n.3; S. REP. No. 152, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
6 (1989). Former section 700(a) prohibited "knowingly cast[ing] contempt upon any flag of
the United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling upon it."
18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (1988).
The Flag Protection Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) (1) Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains
on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. (2) This
subsection does not prohibit any conduct consisting of the disposal of a flag when
it has become worn or soiled.
Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989).
" See S.J. Res. 332, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S8632 (1990). The proposed
constitutional amendment provided that: "Congress and the States shall have the power to
prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United States." Id. On June 21, 1990, the
House of Representatives, by an overwhelming vote, declined to pass the constitutional
amendment. See 136 CONG. REc. S8632 (1990) (statement of Sen. Biden); Wash. Times,
June 22, 1990, at Al. The House quashed the amendment against flag burning, embracing
arguments from Democratic leaders that the amendment would erode free-speech protection
of the Bill of Rights for the first time in its 199-year history. See id. The victory of the
Democratic leadership came despite last minute lobbying by President Bush. Id. However,
-House Republican leaders vowed to resurrect the issue next January in Congress. Id. On
June 26, 1990, the Senate also failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority and declined
to pass the constitutional amendment. See 136 CONG. REc. S8693-8739 (1990).
' See, e.g., Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2407-09 (first amendment protects flag burning as
expressive conduct); Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540 (flag burning as part of political demonstration is expressive conduct); cf. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974) (attaching peace sign to flag is expressive conduct); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 588 (1974)
(White, J., concurring) (wearing pants with small flag sewn on seat is expressive conduct);
Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (saluting flag is communicative
conduct).

1991]

FLAG DESECRATION

course, the consequence of criminalizing desecration breaches the
wall that separates the sacred and the secular, church and state,
and would establish civil religion not just as a subtext of popular
political discourse, but as the law of the land. Hence, the free
speech construction of flag-burning marks the disengagement of legal discourse from political realities-an absence which seeks to
defuse the power of popular sentiment by ignoring it. But such a
strategy threatens to backfire in forthcoming political campaigns.
Superficially, arguments over the construction of this dispute
appear to be no more than technical points of constitutional interpretation. Having determined whether flag desecration falls under
the category of speech or religion, legal scholars lay out their arguments accordingly. Yet, only the theoretical construction acknowledging the religious character of flag desecration recognizes the
profound dangers for the law itself. The sacralization of the nation-state, implicit in a constitutional amendment to ban flag desecration, establishes more than religion. It establishes the
supremacy of popular political discourse over that of the AngloAmerican legal tradition.
While American constitutional theory advocates difference as
a legal analogue to Durkheimian organic solidarity, the
majoritarian sentiments behind the flag desecration amendment
represent the vestigial appearance of resemblance or mechanical
solidarity.6 Hence, popular political discourse seeks to efface the
alterity of individuals within the body politic by criminalizing the
"other": anyone who disagrees with the values espoused by the nation-state. If resemblance is writ large in patriotism (dominated by
the normative world view of a white, patriarchal, middle- and upper-class social order) and expressed in pietistic devotion to the
flag, one need not look far before finding the "other" in our
midst-the poor, women, gays and lesbians, and people of color.
Movements for social change designed to empower those "others"
are therefore regarded not only as dangerous to the dominant so6 See E. DURKHEIm, THE DIvSION OF LABOUR IN SocIEry 31-88, 149-75 (W.D. Halls
trans. 1984). Durkheim distinguished between the types of social solidarity prevalent in relatively simple pre-industrial societies-mechanical solidarity, and that prevalent in more
complex, modern societies-organic solidarity. See Coser, Introduction to E. DURKHEIM,
supra, at xii-xviii. Durkheim further asserted that societies based on mechanical solidarity
relied on repressive or penal sanctions which involved punishment for transgression and
deviance from shared standards. Id. Societies based on organic solidarity in which individual rights were central, however, relied on restitutory sanctions, aimed at righting the balance upset by the violation. Id.
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cial order but unpatriotic as well. In this context, the establishment of the civil religion of the state is an attempt to solidify the
position of dominant social elites and their institutionalized ethos
by marginalizing out-groups-yet, at what cost? Patriotism may
call for sacrifice, but not of the very foundation of the AngloAmerican legal tradition of individual rights.
In light of the power and seriousness of the controversy's civil
religious character, it would be a mistake for jurists and legal
scholars to refuse to engage the issue of flag desecration on the
ground of the first amendment religion clauses. For it is precisely
the heartfelt religious feelings for the nation's standard that propelled the passage of respective state statutes and the Flag Protection Act of 1989 and drives the movement for the proposed constitutional amendment. Only by exposing the religious wellspring
behind this exercise in national piety can jurists and legal scholars
demythologize the majoritarian political groundswell and defend
the integrity of legal rights theory.
The purpose of this Article, then, will be fourfold: to deconstruct the Supreme Court decisions in the flag desecration cases
and demonstrate their inadequacies; to unveil the totemic meaning
behind popular speech about the flag; to analyze desecration as a
magical violation of taboo; and to draw out the serious theoretical
ramifications resulting from the establishment of religious interdiction as constitutional law.
II.

FLAG DESECRATION: THE LEGAL DISCOURSE

Although the debate over flag-burning was initiated in the
streets of America, the courtroom's legal discourse quickly eclipsed
political confrontation. Twice in the past two years, the Supreme
Court has had to address and articulate the rhetorical configuration of the issue. In each case, the High Court voted by a slim 5-4
majority to overturn the statutory prohibition against flag desecration.' Led by Senior Associate Justice William Brennan, the majority methodically tested the viability of the challenged state and
federal statutes against the well-recognized compelling state interest standard and found wanting the government's case for restricting the expressive conduct. In stark contrast, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion asserted that flag-burning was conduct, not speech, and therefore not protected under the first
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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amendment, 8 and Justice John Paul Stevens' dissenting opinion
argued that if flag-burning were considered expressive conduct, it
undermined speech itself and should be proscribed.9
In Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court considered the government's case against Gregory Lee Johnson, who was arrested for
burning an American flag in a political protest outside the Republican National Convention in 1984 on two grounds: "preserving the
flag as a symbol of national unity and preventing breaches of the
peace."10 Written by Justice Brennan, the majority opinion disposed of the government's latter argument, holding that the Texas
statute1 1 was both over-broad and unnecessary. 2 "[T]he flag desecration statute was not drawn narrowly enough to encompass only
those flag-burnings that were likely to result in a serious disturbance of peace.' 1 3 Moreover, as the Court below observed, the statute appeared to be redundant since another section of the Texas
Penal Code specifically provided sanctions against breaches of
peace, regardless of their precipitating cause. 4 The government's
I

See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). "It was Johnson's use of

this particular symbol, and not the idea that he sought to convey by it or by his many other
expressions, for which he was punished." Id.
I See Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2411 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, in his dissent, described the government's legitimate interest in preserving the symbolic value of the
flag:
To us, the flag is a reminder both that the struggle for liberty and equality is
unceasing, and that our obligation of tolerance and respect for all our fellow citizens encompasses those who disagree with us-indeed, even those whose ideas are
disagreeable or offensive.
Thus, the Government may-indeed, it should-protect the symbolic value of
the flag without regard to the specific content of the flag burners' speech.
Id.
10 See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540-48.
"' See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989) (flag desecration).
12 Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2537-38.
13 Id. at 2537 (summarizing opinion of lower court in Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92,
96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), affd, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1939)). Texas Penal Code section 42.09
provided in full:
§ 42.09. Desecration of Venerated Object
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:
(1) a public monument;
(2) a place of worship or burial; or
(3) a state or national flag.
(b) For purposes of this section, "desecrate" means deface, damage, or otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or
more persons likely to observe or discover his action.
(c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989).
1' Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.01 (Vernon 1989). Section 42.01, entitled "Disorderly
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case against Johnson therefore rested on its contention that the
state had a legitimate interest in "preserving the flag as a symbol
of nationhood and national unity."'15
In examining the efficacy of this argument, the majority considered constitutional precedent in regulating conduct; it examined
whether such conduct may be considered expressive and thereby at
least in part protected under the aegis of the free speech clause of
the first amendment. According to United States v. O'Brien,6 a
case involving draft-card burning by war resisters,
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
the incidental restriction on the alleged First Amendment freedoms is 17no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.

Although the O'Brien Court held that criminalizing the destruction
of selective service cards placed no such burden on free speech and
that an efficient system of conscription was an "important or substantial government interest," the Brennan majority found Johnson's "conduct 'sufficiently imbued with elements of communication,' to implicate the First Amendment."' 8
Since Johnson's conduct was expressive, that is, content-based
with communicative impact, the Court reasoned that the constitutionality of statutory regulation fell under the governance of Boos
v. Barry.'9 In that decision, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor had concluded that any "content-based restriction on political speech in a
public forum ...

must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny.

Thus, we have required the State to show that 'the regulation is
Conduct," provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly: (1) uses
abusive, indecent, profane, or vulgar language in a public place, and the language

by its very utterance tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Id. The Court held that section 42.01 demonstrates Texas' ability to prevent disturbances of
the peace without punishing flag desecration. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2538.
11
16

Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542.
391 U.S. 367 (1968).

Id. at 377.
See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409
(1974)). The Johnson Court held that the expressive, overtly political nature of Johnson's
conduct was both "intentional and overwhelmingly apparent," and thus protected under the
first amendment. Id.
19 See id. at 2543 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
17
18
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necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' ,,2o And the compelling state interest which had to be so narrowly drawn to satisfy the Barry standard was, the government claimed, Texas' "interest in preserving
21
the special symbolic character of the flag."
The Brennan majority rejected the government's argument for
two reasons. First, if the government sought to ensure "the special
symbolic character of the flag" by protecting its physical integrity,
the statute had failed to accomplish that end in all circumstances;
it expressly exempted from criminal penalty any burning undertaken to dispose properly of a worn or damaged flag. The State's
suggestion that in those instances the flag ought not be considered
symbolic failed to impress the Justices.
If we were to hold that a State may forbid flag-burning wherever
it is likely to endanger the flag's symbolic role, but allow it wherever burning a flag promotes that role-as where, for example, a
person ceremoniously burns a dirty flag-we would be saying that
when it comes to impairing the flag's physical integrity, the
flag
22
itself may be used as a symbol... only in one direction.
The government's argument clearly penalized the intention behind
the act rather than the act itself. Criminality lay in the political
motivation that animated the flag-burning, thereby protecting one
type of opinion regarding the symbolic meaning of the flag, but not
another: a clear violation of the free speech clause.
Justice Brennan's reasoning leads to his second conclusion,
that the Texas statute did not attempt to preserve the physical
integrity of the flag per se but rather sought to protect the idea
behind the physical integrity of the flag. Statutes designed to protect the symbolic significance of the flag would therefore have a
chilling effect by suppressing political expression. Justice Brennan
"seconded" the opinion of the Texas district court.
Recognizing that the right to differ is the centerpiece of our First
Amendment freedoms,.., a government cannot mandate by fiat
a feeling of unity in its citizens. Therefore, that very same government cannot carve out a symbol of unity and prescribe a set of
approved messages to be associated with that symbol when it can20 Barry, 485 U.S. at 321 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,

460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
21 See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2543. Texas also emphasized the flag's historic and symbolic role in society. Id.
22 Id. at 2546.
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not mandate the status or feeling the symbol purports to
represent.23

In reaction to the specter of repressing political criticism, Justice Brennan recalled the bedrock principle underlying the first
amendment: "the Government may not prohibit the expression of
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable."2' 4
In the storm following the Johnson decision, many politicians
read the opinion as though it had left the door ajar for the statutory protection of the flag and sought to draw up a more circumscribed bill which would meet the demands of both Johnson and
Barry. "We reject the suggestion," Justice Brennan had written,
"urged at oral argument by counsel for Johnson, that the Government lacks 'any state interest whatsoever' in regulating the manner
in which the flag may be displayed. ' 25 Accordingly, in 1989, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act, 26 which was allegedly "con" Id. at 2537 (quoting Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988),
aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989)).
24

Id. at 2544.

2'5Johnson,

109 S. Ct. at 2547. See Pub. L. No. 829, 56 Stat. 1074 (1942).

To amend Public Law Numbered 623, approved June 22, 1942, entitled 'Joint resolution to codify and emphasize existing rules and customs pertaining to the display and use of the flag of the United States of America' [designation of where
displayed (public institutions, polling places, schools), when (daylight except for
special occasions) (not in inclement weather) (holidays), how displayed ("raised
briskly and lowered ceremoniously"), how not to be displayed (as drapery, or below any flag of another nation)].
SEcT.4. That no disrespect should be shown to the flag of the United States of
America...
(b) The flag should never touch anything beneath it, such as the ground, the
floor, water, or merchandise.
(c) The flag should never be carried flat or horizontally, but always aloft and
free ...
(e) The flag should never be fastened, displayed, used, or stored in such a
manner as will permit it to be easily torn, soiled, or damaged in any way ...
(g) The flag should never have placed upon it, nor on any part of it, nor attached to it any mark, insignia, letter, word, figure, design, picture, or drawing of
any nature...
(i) The flag should never be used for advertising purposes in any manner
whatsoever. It should not be embroidered on such articles as cushions or
handkerchiefs and the like, printed or otherwise impressed on paper napkins or
boxes or anything that is designed for temporary use and discard; or used as any
portion of a costume or athletic uniform . . .
(j) The flag, when it is in such a condition that it is no longer a fitting emblem
for display, should be destroyed in a dignified way, preferably by burning ....
Id.
2

See supra note 3.
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tent-neutral" and whose enforcement therefore did not "turn on
communicative impact.

'2 7

Supporters claimed that the bill met

constitutional muster since it was deliberately written to avoid
dealing with the motivation behind acts of flag desecration. "When
it comes to the American flag-that one symbol of the spirit of our
democracy, we care more about protecting its physical integrity
than about determining why its integrity has been threatened or
who has thretened [sic] it."2
In addition to addressing the "content based" objection to flag
desecration statutes, Congress also sought to satisfy the Supreme
Court's criterion concerning "communicative impact." The legislative history of the Act indicates that both legal scholars and
elected representatives understood communicative impact in terms
of witnesses' perception of a person engaged in flag-burning rather
than in the intention of the flag-burner. By crafting a bill which,
unlike the Texas statute, avoided the issue of offense given bystanders, it was assumed that the Flag Protection Act of 1989
would satisfy the Barry test of a narrowly drawn statute. However,
this presupposition proved wrong.
The Johnson decision had emphasized that recognition of the
government's legitimate interest in promoting flag etiquette was
not permission to "criminally punish a person for burning a flag as
a means of political protest." ' Although the Act eliminated that
dimension of "communicative impact" attributable to the perceptions of onlookers, it retained the intrusive need to examine the
intentionality behind the act of flag-burning itself and thereby implicitly concerned itself with the effect or communicative impact
those intentions might have. The law specifically distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate intentions-flag-burning as protest versus flag-burning as respectful disposal of a soiled
flag-which would prove dispositive in determining the legality of
specific acts of flag-burningY ° The Act therefore failed to establish
itself as "content-neutral" since at its very heart lay the issue of
expressive conduct and communicative impact. In United States v.
27 See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2539-40 (whether treatment of flag violates law depends

on likely communicative impact of expressive conduct); S. REP. No. 152, supra note 3, at 911 (same). Under the Act, sanctions would be warranted, regardless of the actor's intent to
communicate any idea. Id. at 10.
28 S. REP. No. 152, supra note 3, at 5.
29 Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2547.
'o See Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2409; see also supra note 3 (Flag Protection Act amended
after Johnson).
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Eichman, which challenged the Act's constitutionality, the Brennan majority had no alternative but to follow Johnson and overturn the statute: "Government may create national symbols, promote them, and encourage their respectful treatment. But the Flag
Protection Act goes well beyond this by criminally proscribing expressive conduct because of its likely communicative impact.""1
In both Johnson and Eichman, the Brennan opinions were
met by consternation on the part of the dissenting justices (Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, and Stevens). The dissenters, however,
failed to raise objections powerful enough to counter Justice Brennan's smooth legal arguments and twice lost the opportunity to secure a majority for the constitutionality of the flag desecration
statutes. This failure was due, at least in part, to the aporetic nature of the dissent which reflected the decentered construction of
legal discourse. In short, the two sides were not talking about the
same thing.
While the Brennan majority construed the case along the lines
of free speech, the Court's dissonant voices argued that flag desecration concerns a wholly different question. The dissenters have
maintained that flag-burning does not raise the issue of "contentbased" positions within the spectrum of political discourse,32 but
rather undermines the very possibility of political discourse itself,
symbolized as the flag's "intangible dimension."33 In other words,

the flag serves as a metaphor for the epistemo-social conditions for
political discourse. To deface the flag is, therefore, to efface the
sine qua non of speech whose circulation is the life blood of the
body politic. Desecration voids language of political significance
and meaning. "Far from being a case of 'one picture being worth a
thousand words,'" argued Chief Justice Rehnquist, "flag burning
is the equivalent of an in articulate [sic] grunt or roar that, it
seems fair to say, is most likely to be indulged in not to express
any particular idea, but to antagonize others. 3 s4 In the opinion of

the dissenting Justices, the hostility evinced by the desecration of
the flag simply left them-and everyone-speechless.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2409.
See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("flag is not simply
another 'idea' or 'point of view' competing for recognition in the marketplace of ideas").
11 Id. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Even if flag burning could be considered just
another species of symbolic speech under the logical application of the rules that the Court
has developed in its interpretation of the First Amendment in other contexts, this case has
an intangible dimension that makes those rules inapplicable." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3, Id. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
31
32
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Obligated as they were by their constitutional duty, the dissenters were compelled to speak about that which is unspeakable.
By declaring the constitutional protection of flag-burning and
thereby safeguarding the unspeakable, the majority opinion had
negated the possibility of its own speech. In contrast, by decrying
the unspeakable, by condemning flag desecration, the dissonant
voices on the Court implicitly defended the epistemo-social conditions of speech itself. Hence, flag desecration statutes did not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate political criticism,
lawful and unlawful speech, but rather established the boundary
between speech and non-speech.
Yet, articulating this distinction clearly seemed beyond both
the constraints of legal discourse and the competence of the Justices in question.35 Neither Chief Justice Rehnquist nor Justice
Stevens was willing to articulate the presuppositions of legal discourse; each failed to specify the criteria that distinguish political
speech from non-speech. To do so would require the exploration
and exposition of idealist, critical legal philosophy-something beyond the ken of the Chief Justice whose "strict constructionism"
reduces constitutional theory to the technical application of a naive "jurisprudence of original intention. '36 Even though their defense of flag desecration statutes delineated the boundary between
speech and non-speech, the dissenters either would not-or could
not-explain the conditions of coming to speech in legal discourse,
i.e., the metaphor of the flag, and hence were silenced by unspeakable acts.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the dissent was marked by
frustration and an inarticulate anger that sought to compensate for
its own silence on the epistemo-social presuppositions of speech by
attacking the views of the majority. In the Johnson decision, for
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist upbraided Justice Brennan's
opinion for indulging in "a regrettably patronizing civics lecture, ' 7
yet did little more himself in page after page of patriotic narrative,
quoting at length Ralph Waldo Emerson's Concord Hymn, John
"I Chief Justice Rehnquist had previously admitted as much in his dissenting opinion
in Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 602 (1974) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), when he stated
"[t]he significance of the flag, and the deep emotional feelings it arouses in a large part of
our citizenry, cannot be fully expressed in the two dimensions of a lawyer's brief or of a
judicial opinion." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
"6See McBride, Religion and the First Amendment: An Inquiry into the Presuppositions of the "Jurisprudenceof OriginalIntention," 6 J.L. & RELIGION 1, 1-23 (1988).
11 Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Greenleaf Whittier's Barbara Frietchie, and Francis Scott Key's
Star Spangled Banner. The Chief Justice legitimated this paen to
the flag by reference to Justice Holmes's aphorism, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic, ' ' 38 in a case where clearly a page of
logic would do.
Likewise, Justice Stevens seemed unable to articulate the nature of this "intangible dimension" of the flag except "as a symbol
[whose value] cannot be measured."3 9 Despite the apparent unquantifiable value of the flag, Justice Stevens believed that flag
desecration "diminishes the value of an important national asset."'4 0 Stevens subsequently reiterated his position in Eichman by
avowing "[o]bviously that value cannot be measured, or even described, with any precision,""' rather insisting that not only flagburning, but the majority's opinion in Johnson diminished the
flag's standing. "[T]he residual value of the symbol after this
Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson is surely not the same as it
was a year ago.''42
Neither the Rehnquist nor the Stevens opinion in Johnson
and Eichman analyzed the "intangible dimension" of the flag that
they sought to protect. The crucial discussion of what they might
regard as the epistemo-social conditions for political discourse remained unspoken. In its place was substituted the insistent invocation of the flag as a "unique symbol," an obsessive-compulsive utterance that appeared throughout the country in the speeches of
politicians. The appropriation of this phrase by the dissenting Justices reflected the exhaustion of legal discourse to explain itself
critically. And although Brennan's well-crafted opinions presented
persuasive arguments for the free speech construction of the flag
desecration issue, they did not seem to engage the depth of feeling
and the philosophical complexity of objections so inarticulately
raised by the dissenting Justices. Consequently, the tensions between these two positions in this decentered legal discourse
threaten to be resolved in an extralegal arena: the political campaigns of 1990-92. Rather than in the courtroom, it is in the political context that the dispute ultimately may be settled in the move3
Id. at 2548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256
U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
39 Id. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 2557 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11 Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2410 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42 Id.
at 2412 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ment for a constitutional amendment to protect the physical
integrity of the flag. Hence, the deconstruction of legal analysis of
flag desecration inevitably moves beyond the normative frontiers
of the law to the broader sociological context of political discourse.
Here lies the point of origin which fostered the minority's objection to Justice Brennan's opinion and fueled the outrage of both
politicians and the public at the Supreme Court's rulings. The disproportionate reaction to the Johnson and Eichman decisions suggests that the Court had encountered a very powerful force animating both the body politic and society-at-large-a force that has
profound and dangerous implications for the American legal tradition in the Bill of Rights, which has remained unchanged for two
hundred years.
III.

SPEAKING OF THE FLAG

The rhythmic surges, which swept through the body politic after the flag-burning cases, were expressed in alarmed calls for the
protection of the flag against "the enormity of the offense ' 43 given
by Gregory Lee Johnson and others like him. Although the threat
presented by political protesters seemed marginal at best, the overturning of the flag desecration statutes left in its wake an abiding
sense of vulnerability, opening the body politic to attack. It was as
if not only the flag but the country itself were exposed to a great
danger, and that it was incumbent upon the nation's elected repre44
sentatives to ensure that the flag be "kept inviolate.
Politicians rushed in to shore up this weakness and shield the
flag, regardless of constitutional considerations. Even such liberals
as Senator Joseph Biden, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, argued that the flag "is a symbol, but the fact that a message
is attempt[ed] to be communicated or not communicated by its destruction is not the real reason why Americans want to protect it.
They want to protect it because it is the flag, period ....
Like
their judicial counterparts among the dissenters on the Supreme
Court, politicians seemed unable to explain in any sustained fashion the pressing need for legal or constitutional protection of the
nation's standard. The depth of this irrational fear was evident in
the irruption of political discourse by repetition compulsion. The
",

'3Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
41 S.J. Res. 332, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (proposed constitutional amendment).
4 S. REP. No. 152, supra note 3, at 4.
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cry for safeguarding "Old Glory" was legitimated by a recurrent
appeal to the "uniqueness" of the flag-an explanation that sup46
posedly could speak for itself.
This "unique" attribute of the flag contagiously infused all
manner of description." But of all its uses, the term most often
appeared in conjunction with the flag's role as a symbol: "THE
FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES IS A UNIQUE SYMBOL
THAT SERVES A UNIQUE PURPOSE. '4 8 "The subject matter
of this legislation is unique, as the American flag has an historic
and intangible value unlike any other symbol. ' 4 The term seemed
to take on some hidden, shorthand meaning for unspoken, but tacitly understood, arguments. Not unexpectedly, this signifier was
readily adopted by President Bush whose comments at the Flag
Day ceremony, June 12, 1990, in the Rose Garden followed the announcement of the Supreme Court's decision in Eichman by one
day. The President stated: "[T]he flag is a unique symbol. I can't
speak for the other countries, but I can speak for how strongly I
feel about this being the unique symbol of the United States.... I
keep emphasizing the word 'unique' symbol of the United States of
'50
America.
As if surprised by his own obsessive-compulsive need to use
this signifier, the President's admission reflected its widespread
appearance in the pertinent American political discourse. Of
course, repetition compulsion is symptomatic of some repression
that lies deeper in the psychic economy of the body politic. But the
disclosure of that secret lies at the end rather than the beginning
of rational inquiry. For the political analyst, the immediate task
remains the deconstruction of the phrase "unique symbol" and its
enigmatic identification with the flag.
" "For more than 200 years, the American flag has occupied a unique position as a
symbol of our Nation, a uniqueness that justifies a governmental prohibition against flag
burning in the way respondent Johnson did here." Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
17 See id. ("flag has occupied a unique position"); S. REP. No. 152, supra note 3, at 2
(recognizing "unique place occupied by the flag in our national life"); see also id. at 3
("Congress is simply ratifying the unique status conferred upon the flag"); id. at 22 (statements of Sens. Hatch and Grassley) ("flag forms a unique common bond among us") (emphasis added).
48 S. REP. No. 152, supra note 3, at 2 (emphasis added).
49 Id.
50 Remarks Upon Receiving a Replica of the Iwo Jima Memorial and an Exchange
with Reporters, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 937, 938 (June 12, 1990) [hereinafter
Remarks].
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What is meant by the phrase "unique symbol?" The Oxford
English Dictionary suggests various meanings of "unique": "Of
which there is only one; one and no other; single, sole, solitary; the
only one of its kind. '51 If "unique" signifies that there is "only
one," is the flag the only symbol that represents the nation? There
are certain buildings and monuments that have national significance and engender a sense of respect among tourists and even
jaded politicians: the Jefferson Memorial, the Washington Monument, the Lincoln Memorial, Congress, and the White House. It
may be argued that, although hallowed spaces, they do not symbolize the United States. Does that mean that the flag alone represents America? Iconographically, that role is shared with other
images, most evidently the bald eagle, which appears on the Great
Seal of the United States, and the Statue of Liberty, which is identified with the country in popular culture. Hence, the flag is not
the "one and only," "single," "sole," or "solitary" symbol of the
United States of America. The Oxford English Dictionary also defines "unique" as "a thing of which there is only one example, copy
or specimen." 52 Perhaps then the word "unique" means that there
is but one flag which symbolizes the nation. However, despite the
Betsy Ross myth, there is no one "original" flag. The American flag
is an image which is infinitely reproducible and which has no original. Hence, in our present age of mass reproduction, the aura of
authenticity that inheres in the "unique" original is likewise infinitely diffused and dispelled among its reproductions. 3
Since the flag's uniqueness exists neither as the only symbol of
the nation nor as an authentic original, perhaps it might be argued
that in its status as "one of a kind," there is only one image of the
American flag. But that cannot be true. Although there is one "official" American flag with thirteen stripes and fifty stars (established in 1960), there have been twenty-seven different flags of the
United States since 1777, barring other versions of the flag during
the Revolutionary War, for example, the Bunker Hill Flag, the
Pine Tree Flag, the Gadsden Flag ["Don't Tread On Me"], and the
Moultrie Flag. Some may contend that there is now but one "official" American flag; however, it is unlikely that the proponents of
the constitutional amendment against flag desecration would ex01

19 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 73 (2d

ed. 1989).

:2 Id. at 74.
3 See Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in ILLUMINATIONS 219-53 (H. Arendt ed. 1968); J. BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 29 (1980).
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clude other versions of the American flag from protection; particularly if protesters were to destroy an historic banner such as the
Fort McHenry Flag preserved at the Smithsonian. At most, one
could argue that the "Stars and Stripes" image of the American
flag, generally speaking, is unique. Yet its vague iconic description
with variations in the numbers of stars and even stripes (fifteen
between the years 1795-1818) mitigates against the uniqueness of
the emblem itself.
If its uniqueness does not describe the flag itself, perhaps its
uniqueness is attributable not to the flag, but to its referent. Of
course, one could argue that the "Stars and Stripes," in whatever
form, is the only flag. to represent the United States, but such a
claim, in itself, is axiomatic; the "Stars and Stripes," then, is no
more unique than the Union Jack is to Great Britain or the
tricoleur is to France. Yet the phrase "unique symbol" seems to be
making a claim broader than just strict sovereignty. In this respect,
the Oxford English Dictionary provides a definition which casts
light on the mystery. Following its reference to "one of a kind," the
lexicon suggests "having no like or equal; standing alone in comparison with others, freq[uently] by reason of superior excellence;
unequalled, unparalleled, unrivaled. ' 54 If uniqueness applies to its
referent rather than the emblem itself, then the flag as a "unique
symbol" represents something "unequalled, unparalleled, unrivaled," in other words, the nation.
According to the Senate Report on the Flag Protection bill,
"the American flag has come to be the visible embodiment of our
Nation."5 5 But unless the attributes "unequalled, unparalleled,
[and] unrivaled" are tantamount to an unabashed jingoism, the
flag's representation of the nation must imply that there are
grounds for the assertion of superiority beyond sheer bravado. The
President endorsed this sentiment in his remarks at the Flag Day
ceremony by citing one of his predecessors: "[Woodrow Wilson]
knew that the flag was more than mere fabric; rather, a mosaic of
values and of liberty."5 6 These norms to which the President referred are allegedly enfleshed in the body politic as the very foundation of the American social order. Hence, the flag is a "truly
unique symbol of all that we are and that we believe. ' 57 Its unique19 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 73 (2d ed. 1989).
S. REP. No. 152, supra note 3, at 2.
11 Remarks, supra note 50.
54

55
57

Id.
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ness lies in our "national commitment to those ideals" 58 which constitute our normative world view.
The sine qua non of membership in this social order-to be a
citizen of the American body politic-requires at the very least
tacit agreement with its ethos. Because American national identity
is shaped by these values, Americans who disavow this normative
world view negate themselves; they make themselves "other."
These values thereby mark the borders of the social order more
surely than territorial boundaries; they are what differentiate
Americans from non-Americans. The consequences are twofold: being American means more than being in America, and if the term
American is to retain its "uniqueness," its normative borders must
be protected. If the flag is "all that we are and all we believe,"
burning it attacks the boundaries of the body politic and undermines the epistemo-social conditions necessary for meaningful political discourse.
Since the American flag embodies American political self-consciousness (what it means to be American), it is logical that
"[m]illions and millions of Americans regard it with an almost
mystical reverence." 59 The conflation of self-consciousness and reverence is due not merely to the place which any standard has in
the hearts of its nationals, but to the specific meaning of the American flag inscribed in its design. On June 13, 1777, the Continental
Congress first adopted the "Stars and Stripes" motif for the nation's emblem: "RESOLVED: that the flag of the United States be
made of thirteen stripes, alternate red and white; that the union be
thirteen stars, white in a blue field, representing a new constellation."8 0 The metaphor of the constellation suggested an analogous
relationship between the heavens and the earth. The appearance of
a new stellar configuration symbolized the "birth" of a nation
whose destiny would be markedly different from all those which
had come before and would come after. Gazing at the flag, the eyes
of Americans would be drawn by the horizontal stripes toward the
canton of stars that collapsed past and future into an eternal,
mythological present. As the culmination of historical trajectories
and the transcendence of the "Old World," the founding of
America brought history to a close, replacing the concrete with the
58Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2411 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
6"M. QUAIFE, M. WEIG & R. APPLEMAN, THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FLAG FROM
THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT, INCLUDING A GUIDE TO ITS USE AND DISPLAY

29 (1961).
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abstract, normative worldview of civil society, and the inalienable
rights of its citizens. History became transmuted into the process
of legal discourse. The stars of the canton therefore signify more
than the original thirteen colonies. They embody the organizing
principle of American society. If, as Walter Benjamin once argued,
"[i]deas are to objects as constellations are to stars," 61 the concrete, i.e., objects or stars, become meaningful only in abstract configurations-in their relationship to the totality. Likewise, the individual members of the body politic have meaning only insofar as
they are related to the normative worldview of the abstract
totality.
As individuals whose legal "personhood" is. derived from their
relationship to the totality, citizens stand in relation to the body
politic as do creatures to the creation. It should not be surprising,
therefore, that Americans regard the symbol of that creation or totality with awe and religious devotion. In the words of President
Bush on Flag Day, "The 'new constellation' of which the Continental Congress spoke was our young Nation, a nation where 'freedom's holy light' would gleam forth, giving hope to all those living
in the darkness of tyranny and serving as a guide to all those
charting their own course toward liberty and self-government."62
In the nation, symbolized by the flag, lies the power to redeem
those who would be "other"-wise lost and incomplete. The salvific
overtones of the totality which locate, complete, and identify individuals imbue the nation's emblem with its aura of sanctity. "What
that flag encapsulates," insisted President Bush, "is too sacred to
be abused."6 As the visual representation of the totality, the flag
makes possible the individual as citizen of the body politic and establishes the sine qua non of meaningful speech-speech made
recognizable by the totality as political discourse. Therefore, to
burn the flag is to attack not just the policies of the government
but the force that animates the body politic. Yet, even though the
flag symbolizes the power of creation that makes the citizen what
s/he is, is the metaphor of sacredness merely an hyperbole or is it
an accurate sociological description?
81 W. BENJAMIN, Epistemo-CriticalPrologue, THE ORIGIN OF GERMAN TRAGIC DRAMA 34
(J. Osbourne trans. 1977).
02 Proclamation No. 6145: President's 1990 Proclamation of Flag Day and National
Flag Week, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 949, 950 (June 14, 1990).

83 Remarks, supra note 50.

1991]

FLAG DESECRATION
IV.

TOTEM AND

TABOO

In his classic text The Elementary Forms of the Religious
Life, the founder of modern sociology, Emile Durkheim, argued
that there exists an intimate relationship in human culture between religion and society. 4 Unlike many other colleagues influenced by the presuppositions of Social Darwinism, Durkheim
claimed that elements of social organization, common to aboriginal
societies, were still present in the modern social order. But to uncover the mystery of societal cohesiveness, or what he called "social solidarity" in the present age, required a reexamination of
"primitive" social organization.""
"This organization, which at first may have appeared to us as
purely logical, is at the same time moral. A single principle animates it and makes its unity: this is the totem. '86 Depicted as either a plant or animal, the totem was seen as the primary mode of
the individual's social identification: one was a member of a clan,
signified by the totem. By virtue of the totem, the individual
67
tapped into the source of energy which animated the totality.

"Thus the totem is before all a symbol, a material expression of
something else," wrote Durkheim. "But of what?"6 " As a mark of
identification, the totem distinguished not only members of one
clan from another but also its property and all manner of clan"totemic principle" must
specific cultural expression. Hence, the
69
be "nothing else than the clan itself.

If one assumes that, despite similarities, there is a radical
break between aboriginal and modern societies, their relationship
can be, at best, analogous. That is, the totem is to the clan what
the flag is to the nation. However, if one believes, as did Durkheim,
that vestigial elements of aboriginal social organization are embedded in modern social solidarity, then "the totem is the flag of the
clan. It is therefore natural that the impressions aroused by the
clan in individual minds-impressions of dependence and of increased vitality-should fix themselves to the idea of the totem
' See E. DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE passim (J.W.
Swain trans. 1915).
6" Id. at 174-75; see also E. DURKHEIM, supra note 6, passim (discussing "social
solidarity").
11 Id. at 175.
67 See id. at 224.
61 Id. at 236.
69 Id.
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rather than that of the clan, for the clan is too complex a reality to
be represented clearly in all its complex unity by such rudimentary
'70
intelligences.
From the Durkheimian perspective, the transference of aboriginal totemic associations to the modern-day totemic emblem helps
to explain the unspoken reasons for contemporary devotion to the
flag. The totem's quality of unbounded, unquantifiable energy inspired awe and fascination in the individual clan member-classical indications of its divine status.7 1 Eventually, the flag,
like the totem, subsumes that which it represents and inspires such
emotions without reference to the underlying reality.72 "Taking the
words in a large sense, we may say that it is the god adored by
each totemic cult. Yet it is an impersonal god, without name or
history, immanent in the world and diffused in an innumerable
multitude of things. 7 3 Although the aboriginal totem or its modern counterpart, the flag, may not symbolize a personal deity, it is
nonetheless the prototype for the "sacred thing." Indeed, all persons, words, actions, and institutions share in its sacred status by
their material or conceptual proximity to the totem or flag.7 4
As a sacred object, the totem "inspires, in one way or another,
a collective sentiment of respect which removes it from profane
touches. '75 This "intangible dimension" of the flag is ensured by
heavily ritualized forms of contact, evident in the code of flag etiquette. Such contact may take different forms. Public Law 829
prescribes, in sections 5 through 7, the conduct proper to the flag
salute, designed to acknowledge the normative authority of the nation's standard. Within sight of the flag, all should stand at attention. Military personnel must give the military salute. Women civilians should place their right hand over their heart. Civilian men
should do likewise, additionally removing their hats. Aliens need
not salute the flag but should stand at attention. Orally, the relationship to the totem has been mediated by an oath of fealty, the
Pledge of Allegiance.7 6 Finally, the code of etiquette mandates the
70

Id. at 252.

7

See generally R. OTTO, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NON-RATIONAL

FACTOR IN THE IDEA OF THE DIVINE AND ITS RELATION TO THE RATIONAL (J.W. Harvey

trans.

1958).
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E. DURKHEIM, supra note 64, at 251-52.
73 Id. at 217.
74 Id. at 140.
71 Id. at 175.
76 See Pub. L. No. 829-77 (1942); supra note 25 and accompanying text. Written in
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proper tactile contact with the flag. For example, the totem should
never be profaned by touching the ground. As the visible manifestation of the totality, the flag, like the body of a god, must remain
sacrosanct. Therefore, handling the flag itself demands a ritual of
its own, requiring the proper procedure for folding, unfolding, and
display, as well as the proper reverence. 7
These rites safeguard the boundary between the holy and the
secular, the sacred and the profane. To transgress those boundaries
is therefore to profane the totem. Accordingly, Durkheim argued:
"Before all are the interdictions of contact; these are the original
taboos, of which the others are scarcely more than particular varieties. They rest upon the principle that the profane should never
touch the sacred. 78T Anthropologically, flag-burning as a means of
political protest is therefore a violation of taboo since, without the
proper reverence for the totem, the flag has been prothe eyes of "patriotic" Americans, the
faned-desecrated-in
members of the totemic clan.
The outrage expressed by many Americans at what they regard as an abomination verifies the religious construction of the
flag-burning controversy. Not only observers, however, apprehend
flag desecration as a religious act. The choice of flag desecration,
rather than some other means of protest, likewise verifies the
protesters' religious construction of the act, even if undertaken as a
form of political protest. In other words, aware of its totemic significance, they intentionally violate the taboo protecting the flag in
order to attack the normative world view of the American body
politic. Indeed, the very effectiveness of the protest is predicated
upon the manipulation of the religious imagination.
Both the minority and majority opinions in Johnson and
Eichman implicitly recognized this operative premise behind the
act of flag-burning. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example, noted
1892 to celebrate the quadricentennial of America's "discovery" by Columbus, the Pledge
was endorsed by the Congress on Flag Day, June 14, 1954, when House Joint Resolution 243
added "under God" to the oath. H.R.J. Res. 243, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). This totemic
rite holds such importance in the minds of some politicians that even the President has'
questioned the patriotism of those who, like Governor Dukakis and the Supreme Court,
refused to make its recitation mandatory for school children. See West Virginia v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). In Barnette, the Court upheld the right of a Jehovah's Witness to
refuse to salute the American flag; to honor the flag-in effect an idol-would violate her
religion's prohibition against graven images. Id. at 629, 642.
7 See supra note 25.
78 E. DURKHmM,supra note 64, at 341.
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that "Johnson was free to make any verbal denunciation of the flag
that he wished; indeed, he was free to burn the flag in private.""9
Yet Johnson's choice to stage publicly a flag-burning at the Republican National Convention evidences his presupposition that the
ritualized violation of taboo-the desecration of the nation's
"unique" symbol-had an effect far surpassing that of mere verbal
denunciation. As Justice Brennan elsewhere noted, "the flagburner's message depends in part on the viewer's ability to make
this very association." 80
To both the flag-burners and the witnessing public, flag desecration is conceived in terms of magical practices. While homeopathic magic operates on the principle of similarity, contagious
magic functions according to contiguity. The recognition of both
forms is essential to understand the dynamic that operates beneath the surface of this type of political protest.
By destroying one American flag, political protesters homeopathically destroy all American flags. In this respect, flag desecration is markedly different from the destruction of profane property, government or otherwise, to which it has been compared by
politicians.8 In other words, it could not be argued that, by burning one draft card, one has burned all draft cards. Although the
destruction of profane property limits damage to the object itself,
desecration of the sacred defiles all similar objects. Hence, the desired effect of flag-burning is based upon the magical inscription of
the act.
Flag desecration does not merely attack all American-flags per
se but rather what they symbolize. Consequently, arguments which
purport to limit legislation to protect the physical integrity of the
flag alone are disingenuous. As Senators Orrin Hatch and Charles
Grassley have admitted, "No one claims that we are interested in
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2408 n.6.
81 Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 380 (1968) (Court acknowledged many
important functions of selective service certificates); see, e.g., Senator Alfonse D'Amato's
comments classifying flag and draft card burning together offered on Flag Day 1990. "I have
to say that I do not think there is any question that if the Congress of the United States in
its legislative capacity has been able to enact legislation that protects draft cards and would
hold those who burn their draft cards in protest of whatever the Government policy is that
they wish to protest, and the courts have found that they can be sent to prison for this, it
would seem to me that when we pass legislation protecting the flag that the flag is a heck of
a lot more important for us to be able to say it shall not be desecrated than the burning of a
draft card." 136 Cong. Rec. S7936 (daily ed. June 14, 1990) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
(debate surrounding S. Rep. No. 152).
'o
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protecting the material, the thread and the dye in the flag. We protect the flag as a symbol ....
2 Yet how can the destruction of a
piece of cloth constitute an attack on the nation? Durkheim argued that "as far as religious thought is concerned, the part is
83
equal to the whole; it has the same powers, the same efficacy.
Since the flag is regarded as a synecdoche for the nation by most
Americans, the destruction of the flag means the destruction of the
nation and its central values. The widespread acceptance of the
act's magical character is evident in the President's own response
to the question of whether flag-burning endangered people: "Yes.
It endangers the fabric of our country....,, The hazard, therefore, exists not so much in a real "breach of peace" as in the magical defilement of the nation.
This danger posed by the homeopathic act of flag desecration
is further augmented by contagious magic. Just as the sacred
"spreads out from the totemic being to everything that is closely or
remotely connected with it," 5 so too does the transgression extend
to all that is linked with the clan's totem. Burning the flag defiles
all those persons, places, words, times, and institutions which one
associates with America. The "enormity of [Johnson's] offense" 6
was no exaggeration; his act attacked not only government policies,
but Congress, the President, the courts, the Constitution, and even
America's war casualties (as some irate citizens have pointed out).
As Johnson seemed to be well aware, the ripple effect of contagious
magic far exceeded anything that verbal denunciation could have
accomplished alone.
Witnesses to flag-burning frequently express their anger at
what they regard as tantamount to a physical attack on the United
States. Although this does not follow logically, the physical borders
of the country are nonetheless transmuted by the effects of this
magical practice into socio-psychological boundaries that define
the frontier of the clan. Flag-burners and their supporters are
therefore marginalized and placed beyond the pale of the American nation, excluded from the clan by their act of self-alienation.
In rejecting the normative world view of the American body politic
("Americanism" in the slang of patriotic discourse), these individu82 S. REP. No. 152, supra note 3, at 24.

E. DURKHEIM, supra note 64, at 261.
8' Remarks, supra note 50, at 939.
E. DURKHEIM, supra note 64, at 254.
81 Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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als are deemed abnormal and anathematized most often by using
pseudo-psychological labels. "During the debate they were called,
among other things, freaks, kooks, nuts, geeks, clods, crazies, nit7
' '8
wits, gnats, goons, and slobs.

Ranging from dysfunctional to subhuman, these descriptions
of flag-burners transmit a lucid message to the American public:
flagburners are not like us. The designations of boundaries between the inside and the outside, the normal and the abnormal,
the loyal and the subversive, all suggest a sociological category of
identity based upon an aboriginal rather than modern form of social solidarity. Although the two Durkheimian models of social solidarity-mechanical and organic-are pure types and may appear
together empirically in different proportions, 88 the response of the
American public to flag desecration is particularly reminiscent of
mechanical solidarity. Whereas organic solidarity is characterized
by the interdependence of different social cells or individuals, each
with a specially designated function, mechanical solidarity is "a
system of segments homogeneous and similar to one another."89 As
evidenced by the marginalization of the flag-burner, outrage calls
forth an anachronistic yearning for resemblance, where difference
is subsumed under a collective conscience that imposes the image
of commonality on one and all.
In contrast to mechanical solidarity, organic solidarity functions according to contractual agreement and cooperative effort in
diverse tasks; hence, the juridical character of the law is restitutive. However, in those cases where juridical authority is under the
influence of mechanical solidarity, "its primary and principal function is to create respect for the beliefs, traditions, and collective
practices; that is, to defend the common conscience against all enemies within and without."90 Durkheim describes such law as repressive: "The acts that it prohibits and qualifies as crimes are of
two sorts. Either they directly manifest very violent dissemblance
between the agent who accomplishes them and the collective type,
or else they offend the organ of the common conscience." 91 Violating both, flag desecration offends not only the commonly-held
87Flag Amendment Fails in the House, Newsday, June 22, 1990, at 5 (Nassau & Suf-

folk ed.).
:8 E.

DURKHEIM, supra note 6, at 126-39.

Id. at 131.
o Id. at 42.
" Id.
at 61.
'
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norms of the American body politic, but also establishes the flagburner as an outsider. This radical dissemblance is an affront to
the homogeneity of patriotic Americans who frequently experience
a self-righteous desire to efface the individuality of the other. Aboriginal societies assume that the violation of taboos automatically
brings its own punishment, for example, personal or economic misfortune, disease, famine, or even death. Though contemporary
Americans may dismiss such assumptions as superstitious, Durkheim warns that "it is always completed by another [judgment],
supposing human intervention. A real punishment is added to this,
if it does not anticipate it, and this one is deliberately inflicted by
men .... 92 Repressive law therefore articulates in human terms
the penalty for the violation of taboo ascribed to magical forces.
V.

ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION

Although Justice Brennan wrote in Texas v. Johnson that no
"separate juridical category exists for the American flag alone," either in legal precedent or in the Constitution itself,93 the movement toward a Flag Protection amendment is intended to establish
"just such a category in the Constitution's text."'94 Even though
both sides perceived this irruption of the Bill of Rights as a question of first amendment freedom of speech, Durkheimian analysis
demonstrates its essential implication of the first amendment's religion clauses. Divested of obscurant language, the flag protection
amendment is nothing more than a codified form of religious
interdiction.
Of course, it may be argued that if the flag is the totem of the
nation and if both flag-burners and witnesses alike implicitly regard desecration as the violation of taboo, then why not institute
such a religious interdiction in the Constitution? After all, as Chief
Justice Rehnquist has suggested, "the government has not 'established' this feeling; 200 years of history have done that. The government is simply recognizing as a fact the profound regard for the
American flag created by that history when it enacts statutes
prohibiting the disrespectful public burning of the flag." 95
Although phenomenologically flag desecration is predicated on
92
"

E. DURKHEIM, supra note 64, at 339.
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2546.
S. REP. No. 152, supra note 3, at 27 (commentary of Sens. Hatch and Grassley).
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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religious presuppositions and magical practices, the law is not obligated to recognize those presuppositions and practices. An activity's empirical verifiability does not necessitate its legal sanction.
Hence, a flag's recognition as a totem does not imply that the state
should punish political protesters failing to exhibit proper totemic
reverence. The weight of the Chief Justice's argument is insufficient to endorse such a law.
Nonetheless, if the amendment were passed, its imposition on
the Bill of Rights would introduce irreconcilable tensions into the
Constitution; freedom of religion would be encroached upon by the
establishment of an American civil religion, identified with the nation-state. The institutionalization of a state religion, even if
obliquely established through religious interdiction, would impinge
upon the free exercise of religion by American citizens. The coercive power of the state would place the nation side by side with the
pantheon of gods. Some religious practitioners undoubtedly would
find the situation intolerable, particularly those who have objected
in the past to the state's usurpation of Biblical revelation. 6 As
frightening as some believers have found the sacralization of the
state,"7 the offense would be compounded by the state's recognition
of the flag's totemic standing as a religious symbol. Paul Tillich,
the eminent Protestant theologian previously cited by the Supreme
Court in church-state cases,9" noted:
Religious symbols point symbolically to that which transcends all of them. But since, as symbols, they participate in that
to which they point, they always have the tendency (in the
human mind, of course) to replace that to which they are supposed to point, and to become ultimate in themselves. And in the
moment in which they do this, they become idols .... They become demonic at the moment in which they become elevated to
the unconditional and ultimate character of the Holy itself.99
Hence, in the eyes of even some mainstream religious thinkers, the
codification of religious interdiction and the criminalization of its
violation would appear idolatrous. And, as Tillich argued, the potential exists for the "demonization" of a secular state, augmented

11

See A. COCHRANE,

THE CHURCH'S CONFESSION UNDER HITLER

237-47 (1976) (quoting

Barmen Declaration of 1934).
97 See West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1943).
98 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180 (1965), overruled on other grounds by
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
99 P. TILLIcH, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE 60 (R. Kimball ed. 1959).
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by the aura of sanctity-a development which Tillich witnessed in
Germany during his own lifetime.
Of course, some might object to this line of reasoning and argue that civil religion in this case is not really a religion since it is
not historically linked to widely recognized religious faiths, such as
Judaism, Christianity, and Hinduism. However, stare decisis has
prohibited the Court from distinguishing between "true" and
"false" religions, and from defining religion itself according to confessional guidelines. 10 0 In dismissing legal precedent, critics would
therefore be obliged to present arguments rebutting the use of social scientific descriptions of religion (like Durkheim's classic work)
and the considerable body of scholarly literature on civil religion
written over the past twenty years.' 0 1
VI.

CONCLUSION

As Tillich's reasoning suggests, the greatest fear resulting from
the Flag Protection amendment might be the consolidation of the
coercive power of the state. By criminalizing the desecration of the
flag, the law sacralizes the nation-state and thereby establishes a
dangerous legal precedent. While the Johnson and Eichman decisions functionally allow the storm of controversy to rage in popular
political discourse, the Flag Protection amendment would appropriate that rage in order to consolidate the power of the state
through repressive law. In doing so, this action reinforces resemblance as a primary model of social cohesion and undermines the
difference which anchors the concept of individualism in legal
rights theory. The passage of the amendment would send a signal-as one suspects its authors intend-to discourage the advocacy of values at variance with the dominant social order. If, as
many scholars argue, that order is biased in favor of whites rather
than non-whites, the rich rather than the poor, and men rather
than women, the criminalization of flag desecration embodies a re"'0 See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1953); United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
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gression away from the promise of America, which builds its future
on equal opportunity for all. Repressive law can be used effectively
to marginalize and silence not only flag-burners and associated political dissidents, but even artists who use the totemic standing of
the flag as a means to protest the dominant ethos. Through their
criminalization, these voices would no longer have even the opportunity to be regarded as legitimate participants in the ongoing political discourse.
America therefore stands at a crossroads in the controversy
over the proposed emendation of the Bill of Rights. Its citizens are
torn between "two contrary forces, one centripetal, the other
centrifugal, which cannot flourish at the same time. We cannot, at
one and the same time, develop ourselves in two opposite
senses."'1 2 In choosing between the principles of mechanical and
organic solidarity, resemblance and difference, Americans will have
to decide who we really are.
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